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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
where this Court upheld and applied a "point system" adopted by the Bureau
of Motor Vehicles to determine whether an operator was a "persistent violator"
within the meaning of the statute for purposes of license suspension or revoca-
tion. The Superintendent, the Court concludes, is merely declaring "in advance
that certain rates are so plainly reasonable 'in relation to the benefits provided'
(§ 154, subd. 7) as to require no further detailed consideration by the Super-
intendent in the ordinary rate application." 55 The declaration of rates, does not,
as the petitioners contend, shift the burden of proof with respect to reasonable-
ness of rates from the Superintendent to the insurer, for, as the Court observes,
"with or without the regulation, the insurer must establish by ordinary prin-
ciples of administrative law that its filing should be approved. .... 56
The Court finds little merit in the petitioner's further argument that Sec-
tions 154 and 204 represent an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
"The standards laid down in these statutes, that the premium rates approved
be not 'unreasonable in relation to the benefits provided,' are fully as specific
and clear as other statutory standards which this court has upheld.*5 7 In Mtr.
of City Utica v. Water Control Bd.,58 this Court, after first recognizing that the
Legislature, when conferring discretion upon administrative agency, must limit
the discretion and provide standards to govern its exercise stated: "It is enough
if the Legislature lays down 'an intelligible principle,' specifying the standards
or guides in as detached a fashion as is reasonably practicable in the light of the
complexities of the particular area to be regulated." 59
Bd.
POWER OF ATTORNEY GENERAL UNDER MARTIN ACT EXTENDS TO INVESTIGA-
TION OF INVEST ENT COMPANY WHICH PUBLISHED QUESTIONABLE BOOK
Article 23-A of the General Business Law, titled "Fraudulent Practices in
Respect to Stocks, Bonds, and Other Securities," otherwise known as the Martin
Act or Blue Sky Law, authorizes the Attorney General to conduct an investiga-
tion and examine persons and records, both generally and preliminary to an
action,60 whenever any such person engages in any practice, transaction, or
course of business relating to investment advice, which is believed to be
fraudulent and deemed a subject of inquiry to protect the public.
In In re Attorney General,0 1 an ex parte order was issued requiring one
Nicholas Darvas, author of a best-seller, "How I Made $2,000,000 in the Stock
Market," the American Research Council, the publisher, and Bernard Mazel,
president of the company, to produce papers and records concerning alleged
55. Old Republic Life Insurance Co. v. Wilder, supra note 51 at 531, 215 N.Y.S.2d
at 485.
56. Ibid.
57. Old Republic Life Insurance Co. v. Wikler, supra note 51 at 532, 215 N.Y.S.2d at
486.
58. 5 N.Y.2d 164, 182 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1959).
59. Id. at 169, 182 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
60. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 352, 354.
61. 10 N.Y.2d 108, 217 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1961).
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fraudulent practices relating to the published book and the advertising
promotion thereof. Only the corporation and its president were served
subpoenas, and they moved to vacate and set aside the order. The trial court
vacated the order, and the Appellate Division affirmed on the ground that the
book was not investment advice, within the statute.02 In a four to three
decision, the Court of Appeals, reversing both courts, held that the Attorney
General's powers enabled him to examine such records.
Respondents argued that they were not investment advisors under Section
359(eee) of the General Business Law,63 and that Darvas' book was auto-
biographical and showed no fraudulent purpose or act. Indeed, they claimed it
did not advise anyone to do anything. The dissenting judges agreed with
respondents' contentions and emphasized that the corporation's only alleged
transaction was the publishing of Darvas' book. This act in itself did not
make respondent corporation an investment advisor which "for compensation
advised the public directly or through writings as to the advisability of
investing or buying or selling securities."6 4 The dissent noted that a judgment
for the Attorney General would give him power to suppress any publication
which described stock dealings.
The facts, however, appear to support the conclusion of the majority that
the corporation's activities, in publishing and advertising for sale an allegedly
questionable book purportedly based on actual fact, fell within the statute.
It cannot be overemphasized that any action contemplated by the Attorney
General would have necessarily been directed at the corporate entity and not at
Darvas. Further, the corporate petitioner was a stock corporation actually
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as an investment
advisor pursuant to" the Federal Blue Sky Law.65 The corporation, in fact,
advertised that "the Darvas method will make more and more profits" for
those who buy the book. In reality, as a result of the marketing of the book,
Darvas' technique, a system of stop orders, was employed in flurries and
virtually bumped prices lower and lower. Of greater significance is the added
factor of secrecy, so essential and protective, in a Martin Act proceeding.
For in complying with an order, which is not unreasonable on its face and based
on some amount of evidence, the dealer, in the event no fraud is uncovered,
sustains no substantial injuries.
The present case is akin to People v. Goldsmith,6 where defendant wrote,
published, and sold to subcribers a market letter, which attempted to forecast
and predict future prices of securities and commodities. The Court found no
difficulty there in classifying this letter as a practice relating to the purchase
62. 13 A.D.2d 75, 213 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1st Dep't 1961).
63. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 3S9(eee). (Defining an investment advisor, who is now
required to register in New York.)
64. Ibid.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)(2), (1958).
66. 193 Misc. 295, 86 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
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or sale of securities, where the defendant earned his livelihood from subcription
rates. Here, the publishing of the book by respondent corporation could not be
deemed in reality a mere incident to its corporate business. After all, its
registering with the Securities and Exchange Commission was an admission of
the scope of its business activities.
The extent of the investigative powers of the Attorney General, as
interpreted in a handful of decisions relating to the Martin Act, is relatively
broad in view of the equities involved.67 In determining whether sufficient
facts are shown warranting an order to produce records, courts should not
require the measure of proof necessary at a trial. How much evidence is
essential the Court of Appeals does not intimate, but in light of the purpose
of the Martin Act, i.e., to protect the unwary public from possible fraudulent
practices in the securities area, it would appear that very little proof will be
required to warrant such an order.
E.J.S.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATUTES STRICTLY APPLIED TO ACTS OF PUBLIC
OFFICIALS
The New York Legislature has expressed in various statutes the general
intent that a local governmental official shall not be interested, directly or
indirectly, in any contract to which the governmental unit is a party.68 It has
specifically provided that a village official shall not "act as such in any matter
or proceeding involving the acquisition of real property then owned by him
for a public improvement. '"69 In Baker v. Marley, 0 the mayor participated
in meetings of the Board of Trustees which adopted resolutions leading to the
condemnation of various parcels of real estate, one of which was owned by the
mayor. The extent of the mayor's interest in the total property condemned for
a municipal parking lot amounted to less than 1%, and he agreed to donate the
$253 proceeds to the village. The mayor's interest in the property was wholly
coincidental and his vote was not necessary for the adoption of the resolutions.
In an action to have the resolutions declared void, the complaint was
dismissed at Special Term. This action was affirmed in the Appellate Division.71
The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, reversed and held the resolutions
void. The Court found that the resolutions and actions of the Board in
connection with the acquisition of the property were "matters or proceedings"
which involved the mayor in conflicts of interest which the Legislature had
intended to prevent. Thus the resolutions were unlawful,72 in which case
67. See People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 154 N.E. 655 (1926). (Where
the meaning of fraud within the statute was interpreted to include both intentional and
equitable or implied fraud.)
68. E.g., N.Y. Gen. City Law § 3; N.Y. Second Class Cities Law § 19; N.Y. Village
Law § 332.
69. N.Y. Village Law § 332.
70. 8 N.Y.2d 365, 208 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1960).
71. 9 A.D.2d 894, 195 N.Y.S.2d 599 (4th Dep't 1960).
72. Cf. Clarke v. Town of Russia, 283 N.Y. 272, 28 N.E.2d 833 (1940).
